On Friday, November 13, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a nationwide ground stop after aging IT infrastructure failed to keep pace with the demands placed on it. According to the FAA's November 15 findings, routine maintenance triggered a surge of connection attempts that overwhelmed part of its legacy network, disrupting critical air traffic control communications and radar data. Flights across the country were grounded, an estimated 1.5 million customers were impacted, and the operational fallout continued long after the ground stop was lifted.

If there's one thing this incident demonstrates, it's that there's only so much modern capability you can bolt onto aging technology designed when the fax machine was considered cutting-edge. Eventually, the limitations of the underlying infrastructure catch up, and when they do, the consequences extend far beyond the systems themselves.
“It Still Works” Is Not a Continuity Plan
Public safety agencies don't have to look to aviation to understand the consequences of infrastructure that fails under pressure. As Jimmy Kitchens documented in Where Legacy Systems Break When It Matters Most, a statewide CAD platform crashed during a tornado response, forcing dispatchers back to pen and paper. During a separate flooding event, the same platform buckled under more than 600 active calls at a single post.
These weren't hypothetical failures or worst-case scenarios dreamed up during a disaster recovery exercise. They happened during real emergencies, at precisely the moment dispatchers needed their systems to perform. And while the technology struggled, calls kept coming, responders still needed direction, and communities were depending on emergency services to reach them.
That's the inaccuracy of treating a history of uptime as proof of resilience.
A system that performs adequately under normal conditions hasn't necessarily demonstrated that it can withstand the conditions when it matters most.
911 Emergencies Don't Wait for Critical Systems to Recover
When a 911 center loses its CAD system, dispatchers don't get to stop taking calls while IT investigates. They still have emergencies to manage, units to coordinate, and responders depending on accurate information. Yet for agencies relying on legacy infrastructure, the fallback may be manual processes that strip away the very capabilities CAD was implemented to provide.
And having a backup server doesn't necessarily solve the problem. If the primary and backup systems depend on the same power supply, network, or physical facility, one failure can take out both. That's not redundancy. It's two systems sharing the same vulnerability.
Continuity should be designed into the architecture, not improvised when the architecture fails.
That's the thinking behind 10-8 Systems' cloud-native CAD platform, built on AWS GovCloud. Geographically diverse infrastructure, continuous point-in-time backups, and load balancing help eliminate the dependency on a single local server or facility. Authorized dispatchers can access CAD from an alternative location when their primary communications center becomes unavailable, provided the necessary connectivity and equipment are in place.
Our Security and Continuity approach is built around a straightforward principle: when part of the infrastructure fails, the agency should have a tested way to keep operating.
A disaster recovery plan that starts with finding the paper incident forms is a warning sign. Not a continuity strategy.
When the System Fails, the Consequences Aren't Theoretical
The FAA's ground stop demonstrated what happens when critical infrastructure fails under pressure. Aviation authorities had the option of halting departures while systems were stabilized. Public safety agencies don't have that luxury, and the consequences of an extended CAD outage extend well beyond operational inconvenience.
Every emergency communications center should know what happens when its primary infrastructure fails, whether its backup systems share the same vulnerabilities, and how dispatchers will maintain access to critical information throughout a disruption. These aren't questions to leave for the next disaster recovery exercise, particularly when real-world incidents have already shown what happens when legacy systems are pushed beyond their limits.
Modernizing CAD infrastructure isn't simply about replacing old technology with something newer. It's about making sure the systems supporting emergency response don't become another emergency agencies have to manage.
Questions Worth Asking
What happens when your legacy CAD system is overwhelmed or goes down during a major incident?
A: Dispatchers can lose visibility into active incidents, unit locations, and response status, making it harder to prioritize incoming emergencies, coordinate resources, and get help where it's needed. As calls accumulate and information is delayed or lost, the consequences extend directly to responders and the communities depending on them. 10-8 Systems' cloud-native CAD platform, built on AWS GovCloud (US), uses auto-scaling, load balancing, and geographically diverse infrastructure to handle surges in demand and reduce single points of failure. Continuous backups and access from alternative locations provide additional continuity protections when disruptions occur.
If your CAD system has never experienced a major outage, does that mean your continuity strategy is working?
A: No. A history of uptime tells you how the system has performed, not how it will respond when critical infrastructure fails. Agencies should demand evidence of failover testing, documented recovery times, and the ability to maintain dispatch operations when servers, networks, or entire facilities become unavailable. If your CAD vendor can't demonstrate what happens when something breaks, you're relying on a promise rather than a proven continuity strategy.
When does keeping a legacy CAD system become a bigger operational risk than replacing it?
A: When the consequences of a failure outweigh the disruption of modernization. If your CAD system depends on aging hardware, shared points of failure, or recovery procedures that haven't been tested under realistic conditions, continued operation is no longer evidence that it's fit for purpose. Agencies should be asking whether their infrastructure can withstand the next major incident, not simply whether it survived the last one.
If a core dependency failed tomorrow, would your dispatch operation keep moving? Let's look at the architecture behind your answer. Talk to 10-8 Systems